“FREEDOM OF FAITH & ARTICLE 25”

Article by: –

Adv Ram Chander Sankhla

Founder and Managing Partner

Sankhla Law Associates

‘Aim of all religion is ONE & SAME i.e. to guide in realising the SOUND CURRENT within……… A Proverb, since Beginning.’

1. But what happens when in the name of very religion, one entity starts dominating, confining, restraining, detaining, threating & arresting other entities, having different religion or faith. Thankfully, Article 25 of the Constitution comes to the rescue for affected and to punish the perpetrators, be such perpetrators are private individuals or mighty state. And, let us see, the wordings of the referred Article, as contributed by Baba Saheb Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.

“Article 25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion:

           (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.

(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law—

(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;

(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.

Explanation I.—The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.

Explanation II. —In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.”

2. Very recently, one such case of illegal confinement was before Hon’ble the High Court of judicature at Allahabad, in Habeas Corpus WP no. – 1079 of 2026, in Kunwar Sultan Ali & Ors V. State of U.P. & Ors, which was decided on 06.08.2026, within 9 days of filing the WP.
3. The seriousness and promptness such petitions deserve, are apparent from the clear, time bound & specific directions given by the Hon’ble Court to Commissioner of Police (Respondent No. 2) & SHO (Respondent No. 3), on the next day of filing said WP, i.e.

“In the event the corpus is not produced on the aforesaid date, respondent Nos.2 & 3 file their personal affidavit explaining the reasons for such non-compliance. The affidavits shall specifically disclose the bona fide, diligent, and effective steps undertaken by them to secure the production of the corpus in faithful compliance with this order and shall further indicate the additional measures proposed to be adopted to ensure his production before this Court.” July 30, 2026, (Sandeep Jain, J.)

4. And on the appointed date, both Corpus (Sisters) were produced before the Hon’ble Court.

What is Habeas Corpus:

5. Habeas Corpus is a Latin phrase meaning ‘To produce the Body’. It is used to secure release of persons, detained unlawfully or without legal justification, be such unlawful detention is by the State or Private Individuals.
6. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, a writ of habeas corpus is described as “a remedy available to the lowliest subject against the most powerful” [Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. 11, para 1454, p. 769.]. It is a writ of such a sovereign and transcendent authority that no privilege of person or place can stand against it [V.G. Ramachandran’s Law of Writs, revised by Justice C.K. Thakker & M.C. Thakker, Eastern Book Company, p. 1036, 6th Edn. (2006)].
7. It is called the “extraordinary”, or “prerogative writs” & issued by the Hon’ble Supreme court (Article 32) and High Courts (Article 226) i.e. Constitutional Courts.
8. The Apex Court in the case of Home Secretary (Prison) V. H. Nilofer Nisha (2020) 14 SCC 161 while elucidating the scope, ambit and object of the writ of habeas corpus, held:

   “13. It is a settled principle of law that a writ of habeas corpus is available as a remedy in all cases where a person is deprived of his/her personal liberty. It is processual writ to secure liberty of the citizen from unlawful or unjustified detention whether a person is detained by the State or is in private detention. As Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) held:

    “… The writ of habeas corpus issues not only for release from detention by the State but also for release from private detention” [Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1625: (1964) 2 Cri LJ 590].  At the same time, the law is well established that a writ of habeas corpus will not lie and such a prayer should be rejected by the Court where detention or imprisonment of the person whose release is sought is in accordance with the decision rendered by a court of law or by an authority in accordance with law.”

   14. According to Dicey, “if, in short, any man, woman, or child is, or is asserted on apparently good grounds to be, deprived of liberty, the Court will always issue a writ of habeas corpus to anyone who has the aggrieved person in his custody to have such person brought before the Court, and if he is suffering restraint without lawful cause, set him free.” [ A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., p. 215 (1915).]

   16. A writ of habeas corpus can only be issued when the detention or confinement of a person is without the authority of law. Though the literal meaning of the Latin phrase habeas corpus is “to produce the body”, over a period of time production of the body is more often than not insisted upon but legally it is to be decided whether the body is under illegal detention or not. Habeas corpus is often used as a remedy in cases of preventive detention because in such cases the validity of the order detaining the detenu is not subject to challenge in any other court and it is only writ jurisdiction which is available to the aggrieved party. The scope of the petition of habeas corpus has over a period of time been expanded and this writ is commonly used when a spouse claims that his/her spouse has been illegally detained by the parents. This writ is many times used even in cases of custody of children. Even though, the scope may have expanded, there are certain limitations to this writ and the most basic of such limitation is that the Court, before issuing any writ of habeas corpus must come to the conclusion that the detenu is under detention without any authority of law.” (emphasis supplied)

9.  The Apex Court in the case of Sonni Gerry Vs. Gerry Douglas (2018) 2 SCC 197 (Three Judges) while dealing with a situation where a major daughter had expressed her clear intention to reside independently of her parents, held as under:

“10. It needs no special emphasis to state that attaining the age of majority in an individual’s life has its own significance. She/He is entitled to make her/his choice. The courts cannot, as long as the choice remains, assume the role of parens patriae. The daughter is entitled to enjoy her freedom as the law permits and the court should not assume the role of a super guardian being moved by any kind of sentiment of the mother or the egotism of the father. We say so without any reservation.”

10. Similarly, a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Urmila Jharia vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh-2026 SCC OnLine MP 23120 relying on the judgment in case of Sonni Gerry (supra), held that, “it is by now well settled that once a person attains the age of majority, she is entitled to live wherever she wishes and with whomsoever she wishes, and the writ of Habeas Corpus is maintainable only where it is shown that the corpus is under illegal or unlawful detention or custody”.
11. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Rajamohan MS vs. State of Kerala-2009 SCC OnLine Ker 6330, held that an adult major woman is entitled to exercise her decisional autonomy and cannot be kept in the custody or confinement of her parents against her wishes merely on the basis of parental authority. It was observed that parental authority may extend to advice, counselling and guidance, but cannot justify restraint or detention of an adult woman against her will. It was further held that, where the voluntariness of the alleged detenue is in doubt, an appropriate opportunity may be afforded to her for reflection; however, her ultimate choice and decisional autonomy must be respected. The relevant paras are quoted as: –

    “14. It is next contended that the 6th respondent being the father of the alleged detenue, has an unbridled right to keep her “in custody”. The keeping of an adult major woman in the custody of her parent even against her will and desire will not amount to improper restraint or detention/confinement as to justify invocation of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, contends the learned counsel for the 6th respondent strenuously…….

    15. We are afraid that such a general principle of law cannot be accepted. A person who has attained majority, is in the eye of law, a person and a citizen entitled to all rights and privileges under the Constitution. There can be no question of an adult major woman being kept in the “custody” of anyone else against her wishes, desire and volition. Even if it be the parents, such custody cannot in the absence of better reasons be justified. There is no contention that she suffers from any debility which obliges her to be in the “custody” of any other. An adult major woman residing with her parents or husband cannot be held to be in the “custody” of such parent or husband as to deny to her, her rights to decisional autonomy and to decide what is best for her. Parental authority would certainly extend until a child attains majority. But, thereafter, though the parent and the child may be residing together, it can never be held that such child is in the “custody” of the parent. An adult major woman is not a chattel. The theory that until marriage a woman must be under the custody and confinement of her father and thereafter in the custody and confinement of her husband cannot possibly be accepted in this era. Such an adult person is certainly entitled to take decisions which affect her. Parental authority or matrimonial authority will not at any rate give right to such parent or husband to keep such woman under restraint, confinement or detention against her will. The parent may feel that he has the monopoly for taking correct decisions which concern his daughter, but that impression of a doting patriarchal parent cannot blindly be accepted and swallowed by a Court. The parental authority may extend to advice, counsel and guidance. But certainly, it cannot extend to confinement, detention or improper restraint against the wishes and volition of the adult major daughter. Right to take decisions affecting her will certainly have to be conceded to her even assuming that, decisions taken may at times or in the long run prove to be not wise or prudent.”

12. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in another case of Joju George & Ors V. State of Kerala-2026: KER:27190, held that “4. ….it is trite that once the High Court finds that the detention alleged in the writ petition is illegal, the writ of Habeas Corpus would become available to the detenu as of right and cannot be withheld on the court’s discretion [Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeijng – [AIR 1973 SC 2684]] and Somprabha Rana and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others – [(2024) 9 SCC 382]. The United Kingdom Supreme Court in Rahamtullah v. Secretary of State – [(2013) 1 All ER 574] observed that an applicant for a writ of Habeas Corpus must demonstrate that the respondent is in actual physical control over the body of the person who is the subject matter of the writ, or that there are reasonable grounds on which it may be concluded that the respondent will be able to assert that control. It is trite therefore that except in the cases of minors or persons otherwise incapacitated to give their consent in relation to matters affecting their life, this Court would have to look at cases where the alleged detenu is above the age of majority with due circumspection, for it cannot ignore the individual autonomy that a citizen of this country enjoys when it comes to exercise of his or her fundamental rights under the Constitution. As was observed by the Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar and others v. Union of India – [AIR 2018 SC 4321], “autonomy is individualistic. Under the autonomy principle, the individual has sovereignty over his/her body. He/she can surrender his/her autonomy wilfully to another individual and their intimacy in privacy is a matter of their choice. Such concept of identity is not only sacred but is also in recognition of the quintessential facet of humanity in a person’s nature. The autonomy establishes identity and the said identity, in the ultimate eventuate, becomes a part of dignity in an individual.” While observing as above, in the context of determining the legality of one’s choice in matters of sexual orientation, the Supreme Court was only following the general principle that it had already laid out in the earlier decisions in K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others – [(2017) 10 SCC 1] and Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and another – [(2018) 5 SCC 1]. In Puttaswamy [supra], the court observed that “the autonomy of the individual is the ability to make decisions on vital matters of concern to life. The intersection between one’s mental integrity and privacy entitles the individual to freedom of thought, the freedom to believe in what is right, and the freedom of self-determination. The family, marriage, procreation and sexual orientation are all integral to the dignity of the individual.” In Common Cause [supra], the court went on to observe that “our autonomy as persons is founded on the ability to decide on what to wear and how to dress, on what to eat and on the food that we share, on when to speak and what we speak, on the right to believe or not to believe, on whom to love and whom to partner, and to freely decide on innumerable matters of consequence and detail to our daily lives.” The strength of our Constitution was therefore found to lie in the guarantee which it affords under Article 21 thereof that each individual will have a protected entitlement in determining, inter alia, what to believe or what not to believe.
13. Thus, the long reach of the Writ is very clear from above discussion.

Background of the Writ Petition:

14. Divya Bhatia @ Zoya Diya Bhatia (Age 20 Yrs) and Ms. Anshu Bhatia @ Amina Anshu Bhatia (Age 35 Yrs) are the major daughters of respondent No.4. Being adults of sound mind, it was pleaded that they have voluntarily renounced the Hindu faith and embraced Islam of their own free will, without any coercion, inducement, or undue influence and decided to solemnize their marriages in accordance with their own choice and wishes, which is a constitutionally protected right flowing from their personal liberty and autonomy.
15. Anshu Bhatia @ Amina Anshu Bhatia, is unmarried, highly educated, having obtained an M.Sc. and M.Phil. in Zoology, besides a B.Ed. degree. She had also served as a Lecturer. Ms. Diya Bhatia @ Zoya Diya Bhatia, completed her education up to the Intermediate level. Both the sisters claimed that their passports, educational certificates, identity documents, bank passbooks, cheque books, conversion-related documents and other personal belongings continue to remain in the custody of their father.
16. Anshu Bhatia @ Amina Anshu Bhatia embraced Islam in 2020 and Ms. Diya Bhatia @ Zoya Diya Bhatia in 2021.
17. The facts further suggested that their father got aggrieved by said decisions of the corpus, and lodged First Information Report (FIR) dated 04.05.2025- Case Crime No.228 of 2025, under Section 87 (Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage etc) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), at Agra. Later on, Sections 61(2) i.e. Criminal Conspiracy, 111(3), 111(4) (Organised Crime) and 152 (Acts endangering sovereignty, unity & integrity of India) of the BNS, along with Sections 3/5(1) and 5(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, were incorporated in the FIR.
18. It is of interest, as well as utter surprise that Section 152/BNS was invoked by the Police, which deals with ‘Acts endangering sovereignty, unity & integrity of India’, having punishment, ranging from 7 Yrs. to life imprisonment with fine. Though no material was produced or mentioned before the Court to justify the invocation of said section of BNS.
19. Also interesting is to reproduce section 111(1) of BNS, for which punishment ranges from five Yrs to life imprisonment to death & fine. It says,

“111. Organised crime.—(1) Any continuing unlawful activity including kidnapping, robbery, vehicle theft, extortion, land grabbing, contract killing, economic offence, cyber-crimes, trafficking of persons, drugs, weapons or illicit goods or services, human trafficking for prostitution or ransom, by any person or a group of persons acting in concert, singly or jointly, either as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate, by use of violence, threat of violence, intimidation, coercion, or by any other unlawful means to obtain direct or indirect material benefit including a financial benefit, shall constitute organised crime.”

Rai’son d’etre of both sides:

20. On the appointed date, Hon’ble Court interacted with both the corpus, wherein they unequivocally and consistently stated that they had embraced Islam voluntarily, consciously and of their own free will, in the exercise of their individual choice, personal autonomy and freedom of conscience. They categorically denied that their decision to change their faith was occasioned or procured by force, fraud, coercion, undue influence, misrepresentation, inducement, allurement or any other form of compulsion, whether direct or indirect.
21. It was the submissions of the Corpus that they voluntarily embraced Islam of their own free will, volition, conscious, independent and informed choice with the sole object of attaining mental peace, spiritual fulfilment and inner solace.
22. That they consciously and voluntarily changed to Islam, contrary to the wishes of their father, who had strongly opposed said decision and had, on several occasions, attempted to persuade and prevail upon them to renounce the adopted faith.
23. With the sole object of frustrating the exercise of their lawful rights and compelling them to act against their wishes, since they have chosen to act contrary to the wishes of their father by embracing Islam and by deciding to marry persons of their own choice belonging to another faith, their father, in active connivance with the local police authorities, has illegally confined and restrained their liberty.
24. It was alleged that various coercive measures, including physical restraint, intimidation and sustained mental harassment, were employed with the avowed object of compelling them to renounce the faith which they had voluntarily adopted and to revert to Hinduism.
25. The corpus further submitted that, being major women possessing full legal capacity and individual autonomy, they are constitutionally entitled to exercise their freedom of conscience and to choose, profess and practise a religion according to their own faith, belief and conviction. They asserted that such freedom necessarily encompasses the concomitant right to determine their religious identity and, where so chosen voluntarily and conscientiously, to change or renounce a particular faith and embrace another. Such freedom of conscience and religious choice finds express constitutional protection under Article 25 of the Constitution of India and constitutes an integral facet of the broader guarantee of life, personal liberty, dignity and individual autonomy embodied in Article 21 of the Constitution.
26. For the sake of whole & better appreciation of the issue, Article 21 is reproduced as, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”
27. The corpus placed reliance upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rajendra Bihari Lal Vs. State of U.P. -2025 INSC 1249 and Shafin Jahan Vs. Asokan K.M.- (2018) 16 SCC 368 recognising the autonomy of adult individuals to make independent decisions regarding matters of faith, conscience, marriage and residence, and submitted that the constitutional courts are under an obligation to protect such autonomy against any form of illegal restraint.
28. Whereas, the respondents argued that the present matter transcends the realm of an ordinary dispute concerning the personal liberty of two individuals; That the alleged conversion forms part of a larger and organised conspiracy having far-reaching ramifications upon the sovereignty, integrity and unity of the nation. It was contended that the investigating agency has unearthed material indicating the involvement of organised persons acting pursuant to a well-orchestrated design aimed at disturbing the social fabric of the country through unlawful religious conversions.
29. It was the pleadings that the investigating agency has collected material suggesting the involvement of foreign entities and external influences in the alleged conversion process. That, the investigation is still in progress and the material collected thus far, prima facie, discloses that the conversion was not merely an exercise of personal faith but formed part of a broader organised activity.
30. It was further contended that the rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 25 are not absolute and remain subject to reasonable constitutional and statutory limitations. That, where the exercise of such rights has the potential to adversely affect public order, social harmony or national interest, the State is not only competent but duty bound to regulate the exercise thereof in accordance with law.

Here goes the final verdict:

31. The Court interacted independently with both the corpus & found their responses, spontaneous, coherent and unequivocal. Nothing emerged during the course of such interaction to indicate that either of them was acting under coercion, fear, inducement or undue influence. On the contrary, both the corpus consistently asserted that they had voluntarily embraced Islam as a matter of personal faith and conscience.
32. The Court reasoned that except for a broad assertion in the FIR & the pendency of investigation, no material has been brought out to demonstrate that the voluntary exercise of religious choice by the corpus, by itself, constitutes a threat to the sovereignty, integrity or security of the country. Mere apprehensions, however serious they may appear, cannot substitute legally admissible material while adjudicating upon the fundamental rights of citizens.
33. It is well settled that neither parents nor other family members can arrogate to themselves the authority to dictate the personal choices of a major individual. Upon attaining majority, parental authority yields to constitutional liberty and individual autonomy. Any restraint upon the movement or liberty of such person, except lawful authority, would constitute illegal confinement and amount to a direct infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
34. After interacting with the corpus, the Court held that both of them were unwillingly confined in their parental home and were prevented from exercising their independent choice solely because of their decision to embrace a different faith. Such confinement cannot receive the imprimatur of law and is manifestly violative of their constitutional rights. Thus, the detention of the corpus by respondent No.4 in collusion and connivance of the State was wholly illegal and without any sanction of law. Consequently, the Hon’ble Court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, restored their liberty.

Compensation for unlawful detention of the corpus:

35. It was found by the Court that the conduct of respondent No.4 in forcibly confining two major women within the precincts of the parental home, solely on account of their independent decision to embrace a faith of their choice, constitutes a flagrant affront to the Rule of Law and a gross, deliberate and continuing infringement of the inviolable guarantees enshrined under Articles 21 and 25 of the Constitution of India. Such unlawful deprivation of liberty has not merely curtailed their physical freedom but has inflicted upon them profound mental anguish, emotional trauma, psychological suffering, social isolation and an irreparable assault upon their dignity, autonomy and freedom of conscience, which lie at the very heart of our constitutional order.
36. It went on to say that equally disturbing is the conduct of the State and its instrumentalities. The State, which bears the highest constitutional obligation as the sentinel and protector of the life and liberty of every citizen, instead of securing the release of the corpus from their unlawful confinement, permitted the continuation of such illegal detention under the ostensible cover of the criminal proceedings. The record unmistakably reveals that the State machinery failed to discharge its constitutional obligations and, by its acts of omission and commission, lent tacit support to the continued deprivation of the fundamental rights of the corpus. Such executive inaction and constitutional indifference cannot receive judicial approbation and renders the State equally accountable in public law for the violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the corpus. The Hon’ble Court continued having said that the Apex Court in the case of Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar-(1983) 4 SCC 141 (By 3 Judges) has authoritatively recognised and upheld the constitutional power of the Court to award monetary compensation for the violation of fundamental rights, particularly where such violation is attributable to the unlawful deprivation of personal liberty.
37. The Apex Court in the case of Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa- (1993) 2 SCC 746 =AIR 1993 SC 1960, held as under:

“34. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting “compensation” in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making ‘monetary amends’ under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen…..”

38. It was thus observed that the present case discloses an exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights, hence, warrants the grant of exemplary constitutional compensation, based upon gravity of the infringement, the prolonged and continuous deprivation of liberty, the severe emotional and psychological trauma endured by the corpus, and the manifest failure of the State machinery to protect their fundamental rights. The Court further reasoned that present case has compelled it to invoke its public law jurisdiction so as to ensure that the constitutional promise of liberty is translated into meaningful reality. Among other, it was directed, as under,

“Respondent No.4 and the State of Uttar Pradesh are held jointly and severally liable for the unlawful deprivation of the fundamental rights of the corpus. Accordingly, they are directed to jointly pay compensation of Rs. 25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakh only) to the corpus, which is to be equally divided between them, within a period of eight weeks from the date of this judgment. It shall, however, be open to the State Government, after satisfying the aforesaid award, to recover 50% of the compensation from respondent No.4 and the remaining 50% from any delinquent public servant whose acts or omissions have contributed to the unconstitutional deprivation of the liberty of the corpus, strictly in accordance with law and after affording due opportunity of hearing.”

And, word of advice/caution by the Court:

39. Before parting, the Court reiterated that “the Constitution does not confer upon parents a licence to incarcerate their major children merely because they disapprove of their faith, beliefs or personal choices. Constitutional rights cannot be eclipsed by parental authority, social morality or majoritarian sentiment. The liberty of an adult individual is inviolable, and any attempt to suppress that liberty by force or coercion invites the constitutional scrutiny of this Court and attracts appropriate public law consequences, including the award of monetary compensation for the infringement of fundamental rights.”

Finally, few points to ponder, especially, citizens of our Nation:

40. It is universal truth that all humans have same colour of blood, breath same air, come to this world through Mother’s womb, goes away in the same way. At the same time everyone is unique & different due to their perceptions, attitude, belief, faith, traditions & many such factors.
41. Social contract theory indicates an agreement, between the ruled and their rulers, defining the rights and duties of each. According to Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651), the state of nature was one in which there were no enforceable criteria of right and wrong. The state of nature was therefore a state of war, which could be ended only if individuals agreed (in a social contract) to give their liberty into the hands of a sovereign, on the sole condition that their lives were safeguarded by sovereign power.
42. And, over a very long period of world history, the Life, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity of the individuals came to be recognised as some of the cherished and basic/fundamental rights. It is the Constitution of India, which has guaranteed these rights in Part-III, ranging from Article 12 to 35 to its citizen.
43. Can, then, does it appear logical, reasonable and humane that, in the name of religion, culture and faith, individuals are restrained, confined, detained and their movement controlled, because of their different way of living.
44. The religions were made for humans and not otherwise. Humans can survive without religion but not vice-versa. And on top of it, religions were made to guide the humans for their common cherished goal. Thus, the ways could be different but the End will be one and same.
45. It is equally important to mention that every parent want their offsprings to follow their traditions, culture, way of thinking, faith and religion. But nothing untoward will happen if children take different route for their understanding, subjected to public morality, non-violence and law of the land.
46. Parents have every right to persuade, reason, counsel, guide and explain their point of view to their offsprings and the apparent danger of the different ways, they want to pursue. But then, it ends here and no more. Ons just cannot confine, restrain, detain their children or other individuals for being different.
47. If anyone does so, law will and must put its heavy hand on them. It must be done timely also.
48. Thus, the present judgement by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, is a timely and welcome decision. The transparent, quick, clear and specific directions read with the reasons and logic, along with settled principles of law, explained and relied by the Court is truly welcome. It will go long way in enhancing the faith in them. If the situations so warrant, the judgement must come quickly.
49. Because if someone is hungry now, giving him food after a week, even if it is very healthy, will serve no purpose.

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